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MEB[_2_] July 9th 08 04:51 PM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
 

Here's a complimentary alert to the others I have recently posted in here,
explaining another Internet/network vulnerability.

DNS is an integral part of networking [the Internet is a network],
networking doesn't occur without it, yet its inherent qualities and features
are also its vulnerability.
Make sure to look at the links and references.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

National Cyber Alert System

Technical Cyber Security Alert TA08-190B


Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning

Original release date: July 08, 2008
Last revised: --
Source: US-CERT


Systems Affected

Systems implementing:
* Caching DNS resolvers
* DNS stub resolvers

Affected systems include both client and server systems, and any other
networked systems that include this functionality.


Overview

Deficiencies in the DNS protocol and common DNS implementations
facilitate
DNS cache poisoning attacks. Effective attack techniques against these
vulnerabilities have been demonstrated.


I. Description

DNS cache poisoning (sometimes referred to as cache pollution) is an
attack
technique that allows an attacker to introduce forged DNS information
into
the cache of a caching nameserver. The general concept has been known for
some time, and a number of inherent deficiencies in the DNS protocol and
defects in common DNS implementations that facilitate DNS cache poisoning
have previously been identified and described in public literature.
Examples
of these vulnerabilities can be found in Vulnerability Note VU#800113.

Recent research into these and other related vulnerabilities has produced
extremely effective exploitation methods to achieve cache poisoning.
Tools
and techniques have been developed that can reliably poison a domain of
the
attacker's choosing on most current implementations. As a result, the
consensus of DNS software implementers is to implement source port
randomization in their resolvers as a mitigation.

US-CERT is tracking this issue as VU#800113. This reference number
corresponds to CVE-2008-1447.


II. Impact

An attacker with the ability to conduct a successful cache poisoning
attack
can cause a nameserver's clients to contact the incorrect, and possibly
malicious, hosts for particular services. Consequently, web traffic,
email,
and other important network data can be redirected to systems under the
attacker's control.


III. Solution

Apply a patch from your vendor

Patches have been released by a number of vendors to implement source
port
randomization in the nameserver. This change significantly reduces the
practicality of cache poisoning attacks. Please see the Systems Affected
section of Vulnerability Note VU#800113 for additional details for
specific
vendors.

As mentioned above, stub resolvers are also vulnerable to these attacks.
Stub resolvers that will issue queries in response to attacker behavior,
and
may receive packets from an attacker, should be patched. System
administrators should be alert for patches to client operating systems
that
implement port randomization in the stub resolver.

Workarounds

Restrict access
Administrators, particularly those who are unable to apply a patch, can
limit exposure to this vulnerability by restricting sources that can ask
for
recursion. Note that restricting access will still allow attackers with
access to authorized hosts to exploit this vulnerability.

Filter traffic at network perimeters
Because the ability to spoof IP addresses is necessary to conduct these
attacks, administrators should take care to filter spoofed addresses at
the
network perimeter. IETF Request for Comments (RFC) documents RFC 2827,
RFC
3704, and RFC 3013 describe best current practices (BCPs) for
implementing
this defense. It is important to understand your network's configuration
and
service requirements before deciding what changes are appropriate.

Run a local DNS cache
In lieu of strong port randomization characteristics in a stub resolver,
administrators can protect their systems by using local caching
full-service
resolvers, both on the client systems and on servers that are
topologically
close on the network to the client systems. This should be done in
conjunction with the network segmentation and filtering strategies
mentioned
above.

Disable recursion
Disable recursion on any nameserver responding to DNS requests made by
untrusted systems.

Implement source port randomization
Vendors that implement DNS software are encouraged to review IETF
Internet
Draft, "Measures for making DNS more resilient against forged answers,"
for
additional information about implementing mitigations in their products.
This document is a work in progress and may change prior to its
publication
as an RFC, if it is approved.


IV. References

* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#800113 -
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#484649 -
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/484649
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#252735 -
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/252735
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#927905 -
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/927905
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#457875 -
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/457875
* Internet Draft: Measures for making DNS more resilient against forged
answers -
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-forgery-resilience
* RFC 3833 - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3833
* RFC 2827 - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2827
* RFC 3704 - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3704
* RFC 3013 - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3013
* Microsoft Security Bulletin MS08-037 -
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms08-037.mspx
* Internet Systems Consortium BIND Vulnerabilities -
http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/bind-security.php

__________________________________________________ __________________

US-CERT thanks Dan Kaminsky of IOActive and Paul Vixie of Internet
Systems
Consortium (ISC) for notifying us about this problem and for helping us
to
construct this advisory.
__________________________________________________ __________________

The most recent version of this document can be found at:

http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA08-190B.html
__________________________________________________ __________________

Feedback can be directed to US-CERT Technical Staff. Please send
email to with "TA08-190B Feedback VU#800113" in the
subject.
__________________________________________________ __________________

For instructions on subscribing to or unsubscribing from this
mailing list, visit http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/signup.html.
__________________________________________________ __________________

Produced 2008 by US-CERT, a government organization.

Terms of use:

http://www.us-cert.gov/legal.html
__________________________________________________ __________________


Revision History

July 8, 2008: Initial release

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Franc Zabkar July 9th 08 09:49 PM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
 
On Wed, 9 Jul 2008 11:51:31 -0400, "MEB" meb@not
put finger to keyboard and composed:

An attacker with the ability to conduct a successful cache poisoning
attack
can cause a nameserver's clients to contact the incorrect, and possibly
malicious, hosts for particular services. Consequently, web traffic,
email,
and other important network data can be redirected to systems under the
attacker's control.


To find out if the DNS server you use is vulnerable, click the "Check
My DNS" button at this URL:
http://www.doxpara.com/

BTW, I was directed to the above site by the following Murdoch
publication, so I'm reasonably confident that it's safe ;-)
http://www.news.com.au/technology/st...014108,00.html

- Franc Zabkar
--
Please remove one 'i' from my address when replying by email.

Smith July 9th 08 11:55 PM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
 
Franc Zabkar wrote in
:

On Wed, 9 Jul 2008 11:51:31 -0400, "MEB" meb@not
put finger to keyboard and composed:

An attacker with the ability to conduct a successful
cache poisoning
attack
can cause a nameserver's clients to contact the
incorrect, and possibly malicious, hosts for particular
services. Consequently, web traffic,
email,
and other important network data can be redirected to
systems under the attacker's control.


To find out if the DNS server you use is vulnerable, click
the "Check My DNS" button at this URL:
http://www.doxpara.com/

BTW, I was directed to the above site by the following
Murdoch publication, so I'm reasonably confident that it's
safe ;-)
http://www.news.com.au/technology/st...2,23992662-501
4108,00.html





- Franc Zabkar


I tried this and got a "your name server appears vulnerable
message."

However I noticed that the ip address in the message did not
match the address for my DNS server in winipcfg.

Is this normal that these two addresses would differ?


Franc Zabkar July 10th 08 07:00 AM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
 
On Wed, 09 Jul 2008 15:55:09 -0700, smith put finger
to keyboard and composed:

Franc Zabkar wrote in
:


To find out if the DNS server you use is vulnerable, click
the "Check My DNS" button at this URL:
http://www.doxpara.com/


I tried this and got a "your name server appears vulnerable
message."

However I noticed that the ip address in the message did not
match the address for my DNS server in winipcfg.

Is this normal that these two addresses would differ?


I don't know, but in my case I've configured my router to use DNS
Relay. This means that winipcfg shows my router's LAN IP as the DNS
server address, and any DNS requests sent to it are relayed to one of
two DNS servers whose addresses the router has learned from my ISP via
PPP. Is it possible that your router is configured like mine, ie is
your DNS IP, as reported by winipcfg, a LAN or WAN IP?

- Franc Zabkar
--
Please remove one 'i' from my address when replying by email.

Smith July 10th 08 09:39 AM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
 
Franc Zabkar wrote in
:

On Wed, 09 Jul 2008 15:55:09 -0700, smith
put finger to keyboard and composed:

Franc Zabkar wrote in
m:


To find out if the DNS server you use is vulnerable,
click the "Check My DNS" button at this URL:
http://www.doxpara.com/


I tried this and got a "your name server appears
vulnerable message."

However I noticed that the ip address in the message did
not match the address for my DNS server in winipcfg.

Is this normal that these two addresses would differ?


I don't know, but in my case I've configured my router to
use DNS Relay. This means that winipcfg shows my router's
LAN IP as the DNS server address, and any DNS requests sent
to it are relayed to one of two DNS servers whose addresses
the router has learned from my ISP via PPP. Is it possible
that your router is configured like mine, ie is your DNS
IP, as reported by winipcfg, a LAN or WAN IP?

- Franc Zabkar


Beats me.

I don't have a router that I know of.

I plug my computer directly into a cable modem, and heaven only
knows what the cable company does.

I intended to get one but have never got around to it.

I always assumed that the winipcfg address was the cable
company's real dns server.

Dan July 10th 08 11:57 AM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnera
 
I am going to jump in at this point and ask which router is best. I do not
want a router with wireless capabilities. This router will be strictly wired
only for security reasons, since I do not want to broadcast any signal that
someone could detect. Thanks in advance for your opinion.

"smith" wrote:

Franc Zabkar wrote in
:

On Wed, 09 Jul 2008 15:55:09 -0700, smith
put finger to keyboard and composed:

Franc Zabkar wrote in
m:


To find out if the DNS server you use is vulnerable,
click the "Check My DNS" button at this URL:
http://www.doxpara.com/


I tried this and got a "your name server appears
vulnerable message."

However I noticed that the ip address in the message did
not match the address for my DNS server in winipcfg.

Is this normal that these two addresses would differ?


I don't know, but in my case I've configured my router to
use DNS Relay. This means that winipcfg shows my router's
LAN IP as the DNS server address, and any DNS requests sent
to it are relayed to one of two DNS servers whose addresses
the router has learned from my ISP via PPP. Is it possible
that your router is configured like mine, ie is your DNS
IP, as reported by winipcfg, a LAN or WAN IP?

- Franc Zabkar


Beats me.

I don't have a router that I know of.

I plug my computer directly into a cable modem, and heaven only
knows what the cable company does.

I intended to get one but have never got around to it.

I always assumed that the winipcfg address was the cable
company's real dns server.


Franc Zabkar July 10th 08 11:49 PM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
 
On Thu, 10 Jul 2008 01:39:44 -0700, smith put finger
to keyboard and composed:

Franc Zabkar wrote in
:

On Wed, 09 Jul 2008 15:55:09 -0700, smith
put finger to keyboard and composed:

Franc Zabkar wrote in
:


To find out if the DNS server you use is vulnerable,
click the "Check My DNS" button at this URL:
http://www.doxpara.com/


I tried this and got a "your name server appears
vulnerable message."

However I noticed that the ip address in the message did
not match the address for my DNS server in winipcfg.

Is this normal that these two addresses would differ?


I don't know, but in my case I've configured my router to
use DNS Relay. This means that winipcfg shows my router's
LAN IP as the DNS server address, and any DNS requests sent
to it are relayed to one of two DNS servers whose addresses
the router has learned from my ISP via PPP. Is it possible
that your router is configured like mine, ie is your DNS
IP, as reported by winipcfg, a LAN or WAN IP?

- Franc Zabkar


Beats me.

I don't have a router that I know of.

I plug my computer directly into a cable modem, and heaven only
knows what the cable company does.

I intended to get one but have never got around to it.

I always assumed that the winipcfg address was the cable
company's real dns server.


Type your DNS address into the search box at this URL:
http://ws.arin.net/whois

If you get something like this ...

OrgName: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
OrgID: IANA

.... then it's a LAN address. Otherwise it's the WAN address of an
external DNS server.

- Franc Zabkar
--
Please remove one 'i' from my address when replying by email.

MEB[_2_] July 11th 08 02:18 AM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
 
In at ,
Vince contemplated and posted:
| On Wed, 9 Jul 2008 11:51:31 -0400, "MEB" meb@not
| wrote:
|
|III. Solution
|
|Apply a patch from your vendor
|
| There's nothing like reading multiple articles on something you know
| absolutely nothing about to make you feel dumber than a box of rocks.
|
| So . . . no patch will ever be forthcoming from Microsoft for
| Windows 9x, as it's well beyond its end of life. Is Win9x vulnerable
| to this problem?

WEEEEELLL, no exactly true, there will be no patch from Microsoft, but that
certainly doesn't mean 9X is left defenseless.

Might try MSFN and other un-official sites for a patch IF you need one,
however, the issue affects your ISP more than you initially, and the sites
you visit e.g., Apache, IIS, Server 2003/2008, Solaris, etc., will be
receiving the patches. 9X will be vulnerable via the DNS activity pending
whatever work-arounds/fixes are provided, though HOW your DNS is handled
will determine the effect and extent of your vulnerability. For instance:
AOL just issued a work-around/patch, whether this is the final fix or not is
unknown at this point.

--
MEB
http://peoplescounsel.orgfree.com
--
_________





MEB[_2_] July 11th 08 03:05 AM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
 
ADDENDUM

In at ,
MEB contemplated and posted:
| In at ,
| Vince contemplated and posted:
|| On Wed, 9 Jul 2008 11:51:31 -0400, "MEB" meb@not
|| wrote:
||
||III. Solution
||
||Apply a patch from your vendor
||
|| There's nothing like reading multiple articles on something you know
|| absolutely nothing about to make you feel dumber than a box of rocks.
||
|| So . . . no patch will ever be forthcoming from Microsoft for
|| Windows 9x, as it's well beyond its end of life. Is Win9x vulnerable
|| to this problem?
|
| WEEEEELLL, no exactly true, there will be no patch from Microsoft,
| but that certainly doesn't mean 9X is left defenseless.
|
| Might try MSFN and other un-official sites for a patch IF you need
| one, however, the issue affects your ISP more than you initially, and
| the sites you visit e.g., Apache, IIS, Server 2003/2008, Solaris,
| etc., will be receiving the patches. 9X will be vulnerable via the
| DNS activity pending whatever work-arounds/fixes are provided, though
| HOW your DNS is handled will determine the effect and extent of your
| vulnerability. For instance: AOL just issued a work-around/patch,
| whether this is the final fix or not is unknown at this point.
|
| --
| MEB

Of course the above does not mean that unsavory/malicious sites or their
linked ADS and other links, can not be used against ANY system. So, as
usual, you must make a effort to address the issue locally, first by your
activities, and with whatever you think you need.

If you're paranoid or wish more security [which some label paranoia], there
are/were DNS and web server/proxy services/applications for 9X which would
intercept these activities, and your HOSTS, firewall, script/scripting, and
TCP/IP setup can, once again, be used to help negate the issue.

*NOTE:*
This isn't something new to the hacker/cracker world, the reason its now of
deeper concern is the extended use on the Internet and against business and
commercial sites [which of course then affects the Internet user].

By Spacefox,

Secure Sphere Crew - January 23rd, 2002
http://www.securesphere.net/download...s/dnsspoof.htm

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q...oogle+Sea rch


--
MEB
http://peoplescounsel.orgfree.com
--
_________






Gary S. Terhune[_2_] July 11th 08 04:07 AM

US-CERT TCSA TA08-190B -- Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
 
Always knew you were an idiot.

--
Gary S. Terhune
MS-MVP Shell/User
http://grystmill.com

"smith" wrote in message
...
Franc Zabkar wrote in
:

On Wed, 09 Jul 2008 15:55:09 -0700, smith
put finger to keyboard and composed:

Franc Zabkar wrote in
:


To find out if the DNS server you use is vulnerable,
click the "Check My DNS" button at this URL:
http://www.doxpara.com/


I tried this and got a "your name server appears
vulnerable message."

However I noticed that the ip address in the message did
not match the address for my DNS server in winipcfg.

Is this normal that these two addresses would differ?


I don't know, but in my case I've configured my router to
use DNS Relay. This means that winipcfg shows my router's
LAN IP as the DNS server address, and any DNS requests sent
to it are relayed to one of two DNS servers whose addresses
the router has learned from my ISP via PPP. Is it possible
that your router is configured like mine, ie is your DNS
IP, as reported by winipcfg, a LAN or WAN IP?

- Franc Zabkar


Beats me.

I don't have a router that I know of.

I plug my computer directly into a cable modem, and heaven only
knows what the cable company does.

I intended to get one but have never got around to it.

I always assumed that the winipcfg address was the cable
company's real dns server.





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